The Value of Life

It is somewhat depressing to try to argue for the irrationality of suicide, but it is the only way I know of to achieve lift off in thinking about what we should value. If we must value our own lives, then we must, to be rational, value what is conducive to that life.

We will start with a thought experiment. To compare the value of one's own life to one's own lack of life, we need two states of affairs. One, where one is alive, and another, where one is not. We are considering the value to oneself of one's own life, however, so both cases must be from one's own point of view. Let us, for the purpose of this thought experiment, suppose a view I think is false: that when you die, you no longer exist. So when we are considering these two cases, one exists versus one does not exist, how do we compare the value of the two cases to oneself? Well, we might try to imagine both from one's own point of view. What happens when one does that, however, is that one has nowhere to look out from in the case where one does not exist.

There are two ways to try to solve this problem. One is a solipsistic method, the other is a value-expansionist approach. In order, then:

If we approach the case solipsistically, then one is a case where there is a world, and the other is a case where there is no world. So, is the world better than the cessation of the world? To put it another way, is the value of the world, for oneself, greater than zero? To show the irrationality of suicide from this point of view, one merely needs to show that the value of the world can never be less than or equal to none at all. Having argued for the presumption of goodness already, we can say that we should always presume that the world is at least somewhat good.

If one approaches from the value-expansionist approach, then, instead of losing the world standing in for one's loss of existence, one utilizes the perspectives of others who remain. Thus, the question is whether the value of one's existence to those around one is greater than the value of the loss of one's existence. I want to make two points about this. First, to prove that suicide must be irrational on this approach, one must show that everyone is valued more than disvalued. Second, people who are actually thinking about suicide generally either do not have this option because they have ceased caring much about what others think or they are not in an epistemic position to be able to tell what others think about their value because they project their own feelings onto others. So this approach is useful only for the use I am trying to put it to, that is, establishing the value of life for the sake of grounding value.

Now, in order for someone to disvalue another, they must have some basis for such disvaluing, which will have to be some further value. If there is no ultimate basis for value, then the value of things will be relative to the observer. In that case, the value of one's own life will be modifiable, in principle, by altering what one cares about and thus whose values one takes into consideration. In fact, if one ceases to value anything, then one will no longer have any basis on which to select others' perspectives from which to evaluate the world, but if one does not exist, then one does not value anything. If, on the other hand, there is some ultimate basis, then we can work from whatever one's present valuations are, as well as derive what others valuation of one should be, and further, if we permit a Kantian move, then to disvalue another person completely, as a human person, requires the disvaluation of oneself as such also. If one has to regard oneself as valuable qua human (or qua rational being, etc.,) then one has to regard oneself as valuable at a basic level, however disvaluable one may be under less basic descriptions.

These are arguments against the cessation of any conscious being's existence being more valuable than the continuation of such a being's existence. From thence, one can provide arguments for and against the value of other things. Thus, I can now support the claims I made last time about three fundamental ways in which we must value ourselves. They are all based on the value of one's continued existence, although each also allows an argument for one's continued existence as well.

Embodiment: one cannot be aware of a world without a body.

Rational Agency: one cannot act without regard to reasons so long as one lives.

Sociality: one cannot begin apart from a society which brings one forth.

More on each of these three to follow.