Interpretive Charity

One of the striking things about reading both liberal philosophers and conservative Christian thinkers, is that one finds them arguing past each other. Each presents arguments against the other's positions, rebuttals of the other's arguments, which are not actually engaging the views and arguments which the other would present. Perhaps this is due to reading people who are more academic--perhaps each is responding to what the masses on the other side would argue. Nevertheless, it seems to lack interpretive charity.

Interpretive charity is evidenced where one seeks to understand a position, particularly a position one disagrees with, well enough to see how someone might find it compelling. If one cannot see why someone might believe P, then it is hard to see how one could have any confidence arguing against P.

In an era with greater evidence than ever before of how human beings reason fallaciously, we can be tempted to simply locate one of these fallacies which fits the case. This removes the hard work of understanding a position from the inside. The individuals who hold such views do not, themselves, think they are reasoning fallaciously, and at least some of them have examined their views carefully. They are as sure that you are reasoning fallaciously as you are that they are reasoning fallaciously.

Besides, if we seek to convince someone--if we seek to actually discuss things and increase consensus regarding what true and good--we cannot simply claim that they are reasoning fallaciously. Pointing out a fallacy may be part of the story, but it must be done in such a way that they can recognize the reasoning as fallacious. Instead of focusing on fallacies and psychological biases, we must focus on unearthing the logic of each others' views, understanding the paradigms within which the views we find so wrong may seem so right. We must find what is right in the opposing view such that it is attractive to others. We will then be in a position to articulate our own views in a way that makes sense to these others, and we will be in a position to show how our views draw on some of the same values and truths as theirs. The goal will be, on the one hand, to learn from those with whom we disagree what kinds of passions must be provided for in our own position. We must, that is, include in our own account an understanding of where the false turns are and what makes them at once attractive and wrong. This may require us to change our views, since we must account for a rational attraction to the wrong turn. Having learned from the other view, we must then articulate our own view so as to show how it encompasses and moves beyond the truths and values of the false views, and how it makes clear both the basis of that view and how it goes wrong.

This model of interpretive charity does not permit us to oppose arguments with psychoanalysis of our opponents. Such a tack may have a role elsewhere, but not when trying to argue for a position against another position. If we are arguing, we are not pathologizing our opponents. If we do pathologize our opponents, we can no longer make sense of arguing with them.