Empiricism and Theism

In this post, I would like to spend some time reflecting on the relationship between empiricism and theism. By empiricism I mean the thesis that all knowledge is mediated through the senses. By theism, of course, I mean the thesis that there is a God. More strongly, by theism I mean the thesis that there is a God who is active in the physical world and who is not a part of the physical world.

One way to make sure these two thesis are compatible would be to suppose that we have senses which relate us to God directly, or to immaterial things of one kind or another. I am more interested in a stronger kind of empiricism which would say that all knowledge is mediated through the senses and the only senses available to us are those which relate us to ordinary sensible things, such as extended, colored, odorous, loud, painful, sour, or rough things.

In the Bible, God appears in visible and audible form in both the Old and New Testament. So God is not excluded from taking part in the sensible world, although he is not limited by it. In the New Testament, we find God the Son taking on human form and thus becoming a physical being. The apostles refer to empirical data in arguing for the Gospel, pointing to what they and others have seen and what can be empirically verified--not merely the accounts of others then living, but inferences to the best explanation regarding their own behavior: the apostles ask others to look at their lives and choose between self-consciously crazy and honest.

So an empirical account of knowledge can account for knowledge of an active God. There are arguments for God's existence and claims about God's nature which appear to be excluded by an empirical account, however. Introspective arguments for the existence of God cannot obviously be accommodated, and it likewise seems hard to say how we could know attributes of God which appear non-empirical, such as his omnipotence or simplicity.

Let us begin with an example of an introspective argument for God's existence. One which I am strongly sympathetic to is C.S. Lewis's argument from desire. It goes as follows: I have a longing which cannot be satisfied in this world. The best explanation for why I would have any given longing is that it is supposed to be satisfied. A longing which cannot be satisfied in this world thus requires me to suppose another world where it can be satisfied. This is not an argument directly for God's existence, but for heaven, which cannot easily be separated from God's existence.

Can we account for this argument in empirical terms? I think we can. The second premise could be arrived at through induction from empirical observation or through the presumption of the goodness of creation (more on that presumption in another post). The first premise is an observation about oneself which might be noticed by introspecting, but might also be noticed by observing one's own behavior. Indeed, the argument is stronger if one has the premise that not only I, but all those around me have this intense longing which nothing in this world can satisfy. Introspection need not be non-empirical. Some introspection, at least, is transparent, that is, to introspect one looks outward. To introspect one's desires, one looks at the world and sees what draws one.

Next, let us address God's omnipotence. To claim that God is omnipotent is to claim that God has the power to do whatever he wants. To arrive at such a claim we do not need to observe God doing everything he might want to do, but merely a representative sample. If God can raise someone from the dead who has been dead for a while, we infer that he can raise someone from the dead who has been dead for less time, and perhaps for more time. If God can part a sea, calm a sea, and stir up a sea we infer that he has tremendous control over seas. As we notice many such cases where God exhibits tremendous power, and as we hear God claim that he can do anything which he says he will do, we infer that God can do anything he pleases. This is actually a relatively simple case, since God reveals himself as a tremendously powerful God. He does not use the term "omnipotent," but he does claim such superlative power that it is hard not to think that he would use the term if his audience was simply philosophers and theologians rather than also fishermen, shepherds, and children.

Finally, let us consider a more esoteric attribute of God: simplicity. I am not convinced that we need to attribute simplicity to God, but an account of how we learn about God probably should not entail anything one way or the other on the matter. To claim that God is simple is to claim that he is not composed of parts. It is usually derived from the claim that he is not dependent on anything that is not himself for his existence. Thus, it is argued, God cannot be dependent on the existence of any parts to compose him. So, God cannot be dependent on there being such a property as "being loving," and he cannot be dependent on there being such a property as "being omnipotent" (one needn't think that such properties have any real existence apart from their instantiation, anyway, but that is, again, for another post).

Now, if all one means by God's being simple is that God is not composed of parts which he depends on, then one can get there pretty easily. We know that God is not a physical being. There is no evidence that God parts could, even in principle, split off of God. So, sure, we can accept the claim that God is simple. If one is inclined to reject the claim, it is likely because of a conflicting understanding of the Trinity. The point I am trying to make, however, is that simplicity is a functional attribute. If we claim that God is simple, we are claiming that the way God has revealed himself is best explained by means of the concept of simplicity. We do not need to see God's simplicity or omnipotence in order to know that God is simple or omnipotent.

Empiricism is not the claim that we can only know about sensible things, but that we can only know anything via sensibility. God has revealed himself through sensible things, and all theological argument goes by way of that revelation. The text of scripture is sensible, the words God did and the actions he performed had sensible effects.